Amazon’s Kindle Fire has, perhaps broken a barrier with the easiest access to online magazine subscriptions I’ve seen. That’s the strength of the Fire: it’s an incredibly effective portal for buying content – and, frankly, anything else Amazon has to offer. The Fire’s downsides are:

Size: The 7-inch screen is simply too small for enjoyable magazine or newspaper reading. Even the magnification feature doesn’t go far enough, and it intereferes with smooth nagivation on the page and from one page to the next.

Weight: Holding the fire is a little bit like holding a flat, shiny, somewhat sexy brick. It’s a load – though it might provide interesting synergy with a bodybuilding magazine.

More-than-occasional glitchiness: The touch-screen doesn’t always respond well; sometimes it seems too sensitive and others not sensitive enough. For magazine and newspaper viewing, that makes page scrolls and page turns an unpleasant guessing game.

Limited media offerings: All of the other issues will likely be mitigated in subsequent versions of the Fire. But where Amazon’s strength has always been the scope of available content, periodical choices seem limited. Perhaps I’m wrong on that; perhaps the available choice reflect the current  range of publications that have dedicated themselves to the future of digital content consumption. But if Amazon wants to emerge as the leading content delivery platform, than it’s going to need to move away from teh curated approach that it takes with apps and seems to be taking with periodicals.

So what other options do magazine publishers have if they don’t want to be limited by (or captive to) Amazon’s subscription model?

Here’s an interesting new approach: TinyPass.com is a startup paywall service that offers the kind of flexibility publishers need. Payment can be accepted through any means – from PayPal to Amazon to Google Wallet to a dedicated merchant account. And content can be delivered in any distribution model: paywall, metered, pay-per-use, etc. According to PaidContent, it even accommodates varied content models – such as the ability to split revenue with contributors.

TinyPass is a young copy and I’ve not done enough due diligence to predict its success. But it certainly represents the kind of flexibile functionality that the publishing world needs if its growth curve for selling digital content is going to continue.

I’m sure there are more products the company could implement. It doesn’t have any mobile offerings to speak of, and its website represents first-generation internet thinking – a source of information but not of engagement and interaction. With a little bit of study and a few billable hours I could have made some recommendations.

Here’s what I told them instead: The opportunity to increase revenue by adding digital products has largely passed, and simply adding new products will probably hurt the business by:

• spreading the editorial staff even thinner;
• raising digital development costs;
• over-running the sales force’s competence;
• stressing customers, who don’t have more money to spend on new products and will be forced to decide which products to support and which to ignore.

In essence, trying to invigorate the company by adding more digital products is just going to lead to more fatigue for everyone – and at best provide only incremental revenue gains.

The real opportunity – and the only real option – is to use digital tools to increase the organization’s footprint and prominence.

Here’s the argument:

In B2B media, ad revenue and unit yields have been stagnant for a decade, and there is no reason to think that’s going to change for the better. As hard costs continue to rise, print circulations have been on a forced retreat. Publications that have maintained controlled circulation levels are doing so by cutting in other areas or – more likely – by winning market share and profits from other, lesser competitors. Neither is sustainable.

Given that it’s not economical to add print readers, the real value of a digital strategy is to present the brand to new people – either by expanding outside the magazine’s traditional market (taking a step upstream, toward the advertisers’ suppliers, for example) or its traditional geography (i.e. international).

That doesn’t mean simply launching a digital or iPad edition. These are passive – cool media in Marshall McLuhan’s lexicon.

But extended audiences demand hot media. They need to be actively engaged; they need learn for themselves how a media brand is valuable to them. Engagement at that level means creating a different kind of relationship based on interaction with community, expansiveness of content, and flexibility in the way content is applied. These are the strengths of digital tools – when those tools are skillfully and strategically applied.

In the real world, it probably means a pretty significant website overhaul and, more significantly, redeployment of staff and restructuring of sales compensation.

Editors have to stop thinking in terms transferring knowledge from experts to the readers – instead becoming moment-to-moment conduits for peer-to-peer communication. Less like network news anchors and more like a highly specialized cruise directors.

Sales strategy has to evolve too. It’s less about products and more about platform – how the media brand provides a fluid and organic conduit between the advertiser and the market.

These are not small changes to make, and this is not a short-term project. But it represents the difference between relevance, growth and prosperity on one hand; and retreat into a niche position or extinction on the other.

At the time of its launch, News Corp. CEO Rupert Murdoch – who may be the world’s most aggressive evangelist for the concept of people actually paying for digital content – said he would consider The Daily to be successful when it has 500,000 subscribers.

Assuming The Daily maintains its average of 10,000 new subscribers per month, that puts it at its defined level of success in another 42 months – less than five years from startup.

For a big-deal project that utilizes new technology and depends on changing some of the most basic behaviors of its intended audience, that doesn’t sound like a bad ramp-up to me.

USA Today took far longer to become successful. Facebook became bigger faster, but it has never charged users and it took at least as long for the company to deploy a meaningful business model. Netflix expected to LOSE nearly 600,000 subscribers in 2011′s Q3 – simply because it removed DVD service as a cheap add-on for its paid digital (streamed) content. Compared to these, The Daily appears to be moving toward its goals very nicely.

The Daily also hasn’t expanded beyond the iPad platform, which has limited potential subscribers. If/when it’s made available for Droid devices and the new generation of e-readers, I expect that paid subscriptions will begin to increase beyond an average of 10,000 per month. By the time it has 250,000 or so subscribers, enough people will hear about The Daily in the course of their ordinary comings and goings that it will also pass a threshold of importance for a whole new audience of people who, at this moment, still refuse to spend money on a digital subscription.

Over time, the notion of paying for digital content will become normal; at that point, many of the media that are waiting for The Daily to fail will begin to benefit from the expensive groundwork that Murdoch’s company has chosen to undertake. They too will begin charging for their content; they too will struggle until reaching a level of critical mass. But they’ll have the luxury of doing that work without the scrutiny that The Daily is receiving now.

I’m saying all this without ever having read The Daily, as I’m not an iPad user. Perhaps it’s not a great product. Perhaps even people within News Corp. are disappointed that The Daily has just 80,000 paid subscriptions.

But I’ve learned over time that the toughest sell is the one that requires prospective buyers to change their behavior before spending money. At that, it sounds to me like The Daily is already successful.